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The inexorable demographic momentum of the global human
population is rapidly eroding Earth’s life-support system. There are
consequently more frequent calls to address environmental prob-
lems by advocating further reductions in human fertility. To exam-
ine how quickly this could lead to a smaller human population, we
used scenario-based matrix modeling to project the global popula-
tion to the year 2100. Assuming a continuation of current trends in
mortality reduction, even a rapid transition to a worldwide one-
child policy leads to a population similar to today’s by 2100. Even
a catastrophic mass mortality event of 2 billion deaths over a hypo-
thetical 5-y window in the mid-21st century would still yield around
8.5 billion people by 2100. In the absence of catastrophe or large
fertility reductions (to fewer than two children per female world-
wide), the greatest threats to ecosystems—as measured by regional
projections within the 35 global Biodiversity Hotspots—indicate
that Africa and South Asia will experience the greatest human pres-
sures on future ecosystems. Humanity’s large demographic momen-
tummeans that there are no easy policy levers to change the size of
the human population substantially over coming decades, short of
extreme and rapid reductions in female fertility; it will take centu-
ries, and the long-term target remains unclear. However, some re-
duction could be achieved by midcentury and lead to hundreds of
millions fewer people to feed. More immediate results for sustain-
ability would emerge from policies and technologies that reverse
rising consumption of natural resources.
demography | fertility | catastrophe | war | mortality
The size of the global human population is often consideredunsustainable in terms of its current and future impact on the
Earth’s climate, its ability to distribute food production equita-
bly, population and species extinctions, the provision of adequate
ecosystem services, and economic, sociological, and epidemio-
logical well-being (1–8). Others argue that technology, ingenuity,
and organization are stronger mediators of the environmental
impact of human activities (9–11). Regardless, Homo sapiens is
now numerically the dominant large organism on the planet.
According to the United Nations, the world human population
reached nearly 7.1 billion in 2013, with median projections of 9.6
billion (range: 8.3–11.0 billion) by 2050 and 10.9 billion (range:
6.8–16.6 billion) by 2100 (12), with more recent refinements
placing the range at 9.6 to 12.3 billion by 2100 (13). So rapid has
been the recent rise in the human population (i.e., from 1.6
billion in 1900), that roughly 14% of all of the human beings that
have ever existed are still alive today (14).
Worldwide, environmental conditions are threatened primar-
ily because of human-driven processes in the form of land con-
version (agriculture, logging, urbanization), direct exploitation
(fishing, bushmeat), species introductions, pollution, climate
change (emissions), and their synergistic interactions (15). Al-
though it is axiomatic that a smaller human population would
reduce most of these threatening processes (16), separating
consumption rates and population size per se is difficult (17)
because of their combined effects on the loss of biodiversity and
nonprovisioning natural capital (3, 18, 19), as well as the varia-
tion in consumption patterns among regions and socio-economic
classes (20, 21). Sustainability requires an eventual stabilization
of Earth’s human population because resource demands and
living space increase with population size, and proportional
ecological damage increases even when consumption patterns
stabilize (22, 23); it is therefore essential that scenarios for future
human population dynamics are explored critically if we are to
plan for a healthy future society (24).
There have been repeated calls for rapid action to reduce the
world population humanely over the coming decades to centuries
(1, 3), with lay proponents complaining that sustainability
advocates ignore the “elephant in the room” of human over-
population (25, 26). Amoral wars and global pandemics aside,
the only humane way to reduce the size of the human population
is to encourage lower per capita fertility. This lowering has been
happening in general for decades (27, 28), a result mainly of
higher levels of education and empowerment of women in the
developed world, the rising affluence of developing nations, and
the one-child policy of China (29–32). Despite this change, en-
vironmental conditions have worsened globally because of the
overcompensating effects of rising affluence-linked population
and consumption rates (3, 18). One of the problems is that there
is still a large unmet need for more expansive and effective
family-planning assistance, which has been previously hindered
by conservative religious and political opposition, premature
claims that rapid population growth has ended, and the reallo-
cation of resources toward other health issues (33). Effective
contraception has also been delayed because of poor education
regarding its availability, supply, cost, and safety, as well as op-
position from family members (33). Notwithstanding, some ar-
gue that if we could facilitate the transition to lower fertility
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rates, most of the sustainability problems associated with the
large human population would be greatly alleviated (3, 34–36).
Even in an ideal socio-political setting for lower birth-rate pol-
icies and the commitment to global-scale family planning, however,
several questions remain: (i) How quickly could we achieve
a smaller human population by adjusting such sociological levers
(or via unexpected, large-scale stressors), and (ii) where in the
world are human populations likely to do the most damage to their
supporting environment over the coming century? To address
the first of these questions on population trajectories, we built
deterministic population models for humans, based on broad,
multiregion geographical data drawn from the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United States Census Bureau.
Using a Leslie-matrix approach, we projected the 2013 world
population through to the year 2100 with several adjustments to
fertility, mortality, and age at first childbirth (primiparity) to in-
vestigate the relative importance of different vital rates (repre-
senting possible policy interventions or stressors) on the trajectory
and population size at the end of this century, and on the ratio of
the “dependent” component of the population (<15 and >65 y)
to the remainder (28). Existing projections of the human pop-
ulation typically do not include mass mortality events, of which
there has been no prior experience, such as worldwide epidemics,
nuclear wars, or climate change (32). We therefore also added
four “catastrophe” scenarios to simulate the possible effects of
climate disruption, world wars, or global pandemics on pop-
ulation trends. Our aim was not to forecast the actual population
size at the end of this century; rather, we sought to compare the
sensitivity of population trajectories to plausible and even un-
likely social phenomena, and consider how these might influence
long-term human demography.
To address the second question on environmental impacts of
future populations, we focused on 14 region-specific projections of
the human population, and related these to the areas of the planet
most in need of environmental protection from the perspective of
unique ecosystems: Biodiversity Hotspots (37). Although there are
other ways of measuring regional patterns in environmental deg-
radation and susceptibility (18), today’s 35 Biodiversity Hotspots are
internationally recognized as regions containing the most unique
(endemic) species that are currently experiencing the greatest
threats from human endeavors (37, 38). Previous studies have
shown that current human population densities and growth rates
are higher on average in Biodiversity Hotspots than elsewhere (39,
40), contributing to higher rates of deforestation and species loss
(41). We used a similar framework to consider future human
population trajectories of different regions relative to the distribu-
tion of global Biodiversity Hotspots, with the goal of assessing the
relative change in threat to these unique environments after ac-
counting for geographical differences in growth rates.
Methods
Demographic Data. Most published human demographic data are expressed as
mortality and birth rates per 5-y age class, oftenwith the first year of life provided
separately. Themost reliable age-specificmortality rates are reportedby theWHO
under the auspices of theWHO-CHOICE project (www.who.int/choice). Although
originally compiled for modeling the progression of diseases in the human
population, we opted to use these data because they are conveniently expressed
as mortality rates per yearly age class and per WHO subregion (42), and so do
not require smoothing or interpolation. The 14 WHO-CHOICE subregions, based
on geographical location and demographic profiles and their constituent
countries (www.who.int/choice), are listed in the legend of Fig. 4.
For globally averaged, age-specific (0–100+ y) mortalities, we aggregated
the mean mortalities across each WHO subregion, with each age-specific (x)
mortality (Mx) weighted by its population size vector (Nx) for each sub-
region. We estimated the 2013 Nx from the 2005 Nx provided by the WHO-
CHOICE project by multiplying each Nx by the ratio of N2013:N2005, with N2013
sourced for each subregion from the US Census Bureau International Data-
base (www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb).
We accessed 2013 fertility data by 5-y age groups from the US Census
Bureau International Database. We converted the births per 1,000 women
into age-specific fertilities (mx) by dividing the 5-y classes equally among
their constituent years and accounting for breeding female mortality within
each of the 5-y classes. All age-specific population size, mortality, and fer-
tility data we derived from these sources are available online at dx.doi.org/
10.4227/05/5386F14C65D34.
Leslie Matrix. We defined a prebreeding 100 (i) × 100 (j) element, Leslie matrix
(M) for females only, multiplying the subsequent projected population vector
by the overall sex ratio to estimate total population size at each time step.
Fertilities (mx) occupied the first row of the matrix (ages 15–49), survival
probabilities (1 – Mx) were applied to the subdiagonal, and the final diagonal
transition probability (Mi,j) represented survival of the 100+ age class. Complete
R code (43) for the scenario projections is provided in Datasets S1 and S2.
Global Scenarios. For each projection, we multiplied the Nx vector byM for 87
yearly time steps (2013–2100, except for one fertility-reduction scenario that
was extended to 2300). All projections were deterministic. Scenario 1 was
a business-as-usual (BAU) “control” projection, with all matrix elements kept
constant at 2013 values. Scenario 2a was a “realistic” projection with a linear
decline inMx, starting in 2013, to 50% of their initial values by 2100 (i.e., via
improving diet, affluence, medicine, female empowerment, and so forth).
We also emulated a shift toward older primiparity by allocating 50% of the
fertility in the youngest reproductive age class (15–24) evenly across the
older breeding classes (25–49), following a linear change function from 2013
to 2100 (as per the decline in Mx). We then implemented a linear decline in
total fertility from the 2013 starting value of 2.37 children per female to 2.00
by 2100 (to simulate the ongoing trend observed in recent decades). The
rate of fertility decline was thus 0.0042 children per female per year. Sce-
nario 2b was identical to Scenario 2 in all respects except mortality remained
constant over the projection interval. Scenario 3 was similar to Scenario 2a,
except that we reduced total fertility more steeply, to one child per female
by 2100 to emulate, for example, a hypothetical move toward a worldwide
one-child policy by the end of the century. This rate of fertility decline was
thus 0.0157 children per female per year. In scenario 4, we reduced fertility
even more rapidly to one child per female by 2045 (fertility decline rate =
0.0427) and kept it constant thereafter to 2100; we also removed the as-
sumption that mortality (Mx) would decline over the projection interval, so
we maintained Mx at 2013 values. In Scenario 5, we examined how a global
avoidance of unintended pregnancies resulting in births, via reproduction
education, family planning, and cultural shift (3), would affect our projec-
tions to 2100. Using data from 2008, there were 208 million pregnancies
globally, of which an estimated 86 million were unintended (44). Of these
86 million, ∼11 million were miscarried, 41 million aborted, and 33 million
resulted in unplanned births (44). In this scenario, therefore, we assumed
that 33 of 208 (15.8%) births per year of the projection would not occur if
unwanted pregnancies were avoided entirely.
Scenarios 6–9 represent a comparative “what if?” exploration of different
levels of chronic or acute elevated mortality rates, spanning the plausible
through to the highly unlikely. Scenario 6 used the BAU matrix, but with
childhood mortality increasing linearly to double the 2013 values by 2100 to
simulate food shortages caused by, for example, climate-disruption impacts
on crop yields (45). Scenario 7 implemented a broad-scale mortality event
equivalent to the approximate number of human deaths arising from the
First and Second World Wars and the Spanish flu combined (Σ = 131 million
deaths; http://necrometrics.com) as a proportion of the midway (i.e., 2056)
projected population size (9.95 billion) (Results). Based on a world population
of 2.5 billion at the end of the Second World War, this combined death toll
from these historical events represented 5.2% of the global population; thus,
we applied this proportional additional mortality to the 2056 (midway) world
population estimate, which equates to about 500 million deaths over 5 y. For
Scenario 8, we implemented a mass mortality event that killed 2 billion
people worldwide (again, implemented over a 5-y period from 2056 on-
wards). Scenario 9 was identical to Scenario 8, only we increased the death
toll substantially, to 6 billion, and implemented the catastrophe one-third of
the way through the projection interval (i.e., 2041) to allow for a longer re-
covery from its consequences. A summary of the initial parameter values and
their temporal changes for all scenarios is provided in Table S1.
Although potentially exaggerated, we also assumed that the demographic
rates of the overall humanpopulationwould shiftmarkedly following such large
mortality events, thus mimicking a type of postwar condition similar to that
observed in the 1950s (i.e., the “baby boom”). Following the final year of the
mass mortality catastrophe, we (arbitrarily) assumed that fertility would double,
but then decline linearly to 2013 values by 2100. We also assumed that overall












mortality would double following the final year of the catastrophe (e.g., to
emulate lingering effects such as food shortages, disrupted social interactions
and disease epidemics), but then decline linearly to 2013 values by 2100.
For all scenario-based projections, we calculated the yearly total pop-
ulation size (males and females), and the proportion of the population
<15-y-old or >65-y-old. The sum of this proportion (i.e., the proportion in
the 15- to 65-y classes) relative to the remainder represents the “dependency
ratio,” which is a metric of the population generally considered to be de-
pendent on the productivity of used society (28). To test the sensitivity of the
choice of the upper-age boundary on the overall ratio (e.g., 65 y), we re-
peated the calculation for the upper “dependant” age of 75 y.
Subregional Scenarios.Wealternatively projected each of theWHO subregions
separately using their subregion-specific mortalities and US Census Bureau
fertilities and population vectors, without assuming any changes over time to
the component vital rates ormigration between regions. Indeed, interregional
migration remains one of the most difficult parameters to predict for the
human population (32). For comparison, we also repeated the subregional
projections assuming the same linear change in vital rates as per Scenario 2a
for the global projections. For each region, we overlaid the extent of the
latest 35 Conservation International Biodiversity Hotspots (37, 38) (shapefile
available from databasin.org) to determine which Hotspots were associated
with the most rapid projected expansion of the human population over the
coming century, and the areas of highest human population density in 2100.
Results
Projection Scenarios. The population projections for the BAU
(Scenario 1) and realistic changes in vital rates (Scenario 2a)
produced similar 2050 [9.23 and 9.30 billion, respectively; dif-
ference (Δ) = 68 million] and end-of-century populations (10.42
and 10.35 billion, respectively; Δ = 70 million) (Fig. 1A). The
more draconian fertility reduction to a global one child per
woman by 2100 (Scenario 3) resulted in a peak population size of
8.9 billion in 2056, followed by a decline to ∼7 billion by 2100
(i.e., a return to the 2013 population size) (Fig. 1A). Enforcing
a one child per female policy worldwide by 2045 and without
improving survival (Scenario 4) resulted in a peak population
size of 7.95 billion in 2037, 7.59 billion by 2050, and a rapid re-
duction to 3.45 billion by 2100. Avoiding the approximate 16% of
annual births resulting from unintended pregnancies (Scenario 5)
reduced the projected population in 2050 to 8.39 billion (com-
pared to, for example, 9.30 billion in Scenario 2a; Δ = 901
million), and in 2100 to 7.3 billion (compared to, for example,
10.4 billion in Scenario 2a; Δ = 3014 million) (Fig. 1A).
The most striking aspect of the “hypothetical catastrophe” sce-
narios was just how little effect even these severe mass mortality
events had on the final population size projected for 2100 (Fig. 1B).
The climate change (childhood mortality increase) (Scenario 5),
future proportional “World Wars” mortality event (Scenario 6),
and BAU (Scenario 1) projections all produced between 9.9 and
10.4 billion people by 2100 (Fig. 1B). The catastrophic mass
mortality of 2 billion dead within 5 y half-way through the pro-
jection interval (Scenario 7) resulted in a population size of
8.4 billion by 2100, whereas the 6 billion-dead scenario (Scenario
8) implemented one-third of the way through the projection still
led to a population of 5.1 billion by 2100 (Fig. 1B).
Projecting Scenario 3 (worldwide one-child policy by 2100,
assuming no further reduction in total fertility thereafter) to
2300, the world population would fall to half of its 2013 size by
2130, and one-quarter by 2158 (Fig. 2). This result is equivalent
to an instantaneous rate of population change (r) of −0.0276
once the age-specific vital rates of the matrix stabilize (i.e., after
we imposed invariant vital rates at 2100 and onwards).
Another notable aspect of the noncatastrophe projections (Sce-
narios 1 and 3) was the relative stability of the dependency ratio
during the projection interval (Fig. 3). The ratio varied from 0.54 to
a maximum of 0.67 (Scenario 3) by 2100, with the latter equating to
∼1.5 (1/0.67) working adults per dependant. Increasing the older
dependency age to 75 only stabilized the dependency ratio further
(Scenario 1: 0.38–0.44; Scenario 3: 0.33–0.44) (Fig. S1).
Subregions. Region 4 (Americas B) overlaps the highest number
of Biodiversity Hotspots (9), although it is projected to have the
fourth lowest population density by 2100 (44.8 persons km−2)
(Table S2). The regions with the next-highest number of Hot-
spots are Regions 2 (Africa E) and 14 (Western Pacific B) (eight
each) (Fig. 4 and Table S1). Although Region 14 had the largest
human population in 2013, Region 2 had the second-highest
projected rate of increase of all regions (Fig. 4). Furthermore,
two Hotspots in Region 2 (Eastern Afromontane, Horn of
Africa) are also found in Regions 6 and 7 (Eastern Mediterra-
nean), with the sixth- and third-highest rates of increase, re-
spectively (Table S2). Both African regions (Regions 1 and 2) are
also projected to have the second- (Region 1: 246.4 persons km−2)
and third-highest (Region 2: 241.3 persons km−2) population
A
B
Fig. 1. Scenario-based projections of world population from 2013 to 2100. (A)
Scenario 1: BAU population growth (constant 2013 age-specific vital rates);
Scenario 2a: reducing mortality (M), increasing age at primiparity (α), declining
fertility to two children per female (Ft = 2) by 2100; Scenario 2b: same as Scenario
2a, but without reduced mortality; Scenario 3: same as Scenario 2a, but Ft = 1;
Scenario 4: same as Scenario 3, but without reduced mortality and Ft = 1 by 2045
and thereafter constant to 2100; Scenario 5: avoiding all unintended pregnancies
resulting in annual births. High and low projections by the United Nations (12)
are shown as a grayed area, and the revised range for 2100 (13) is also indicated.
(B) Scenario 6: elevated childhood mortality (Mj) from climate change (CC);
Scenario 7: mass mortality event over a 5-y period starting 2056, equal to the
proportion of combined number of deaths fromWorld War I, World War II, and
Spanish flu scaled to the mid-21st century population; Scenario 8: 2 billion people
killed because of a global pandemic or war spread over 5 y, starting midway (i.e.,
2056) through the projection interval; Scenario 9: 6 billion people killed because
of a global pandemic or war spread over 5 y and initiated one-third of the way
through the projection interval (i.e., 2041). The mass mortality windows are in-
dicated as gray bars.









Fig. 2. Long-term outlook. Scenario-based projection of world population from
2013 to 2300 based on constant 2013 age-specific vital rates but declining fertility
to one child per female (Ft = 1) by 2100 (fertility held constant thereafter).
Population reduces to one-half of its 2013 size by 2130, and one-quarter by 2158.
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densities by 2100 (Fig. 4 and Table S1). The Biodiversity
Hotspots of Region 12 (Southeast Asia D: Himalaya, Indo-
Burma, Western Ghats, and Sri Lanka) are also a particular con-
cern because the region currently has the second-largest population
size and is projected to double by the end of this century, producing
the highest projected human population density of any subregion
(656 persons km−2) (Fig. 4 and Table S1). If we alternatively as-
sumed linear declines in fertility and mortality, and increasing age
at primiparity (i.e., Scenario 2a conditions), the subregional
rankings according to projected rate of increase were nearly
identical (except for the relative ranking of the last two regions)
(Table S3). For these projections, the final mean population
densities were between 16% and 37% lower (Table S3) than those
predicted assuming constant vital rates (Fig. 4 and Table S2).
Discussion
Although not denying the urgency with which the aggregate im-
pacts of humanity must be mitigated on a planetary scale (3), our
models clearly demonstrate that the current momentum (28) of the
global human population precludes any demographic “quick fixes.”
That is, even if the human collective were to pull as hard as pos-
sible on the total fertility policy lever (via a range of economic,
medical, and social interventions), the result would be ineffective
in mitigating the immediately looming global sustainability crises
(including anthropogenic climate disruption), for which we need to
have major solutions well under way by 2050 and essentially solved
by 2100 (3, 46, 47). However, this conclusion excludes the possi-
bility that global society could avoid all unintended births or that
the global average fertility rate could decline to one child per fe-
male by 2100. Had humanity acted more to constrain fertility be-
fore this enormous demographic momentum had developed (e.g.,
immediately following World War II), the prospect of reducing our
future impacts would have been more easily achievable.
That said, the projections assuming all unintended pregnancies
resulting in births were avoided each year resulted in a global
human population size in 2100 that was over 3 billion people
smaller than one assuming no similar reduction in birth rates
(compare, for example, Scenarios 5 and 2a). Similarly, a global
move toward one child per female by 2100 or, more radically, by
2045, indicated that there could be theoretically billions fewer
people by the end of the century. More realistically, if worldwide
average fertility could be reduced to two children per female by
2020 (compared with 2.37 today), there would be 777 million fewer
people to feed planet-wide by 2050 (compared with the BAU;
scenario not shown in Results). Although these scenarios would be
challenging to achieve, our model comparisons reveal that effective
family planning and reproduction education worldwide (48) have
great potential to reduce the size of the human population and
alleviate pressure on resource availability over the long term, in
addition to generating other social advantages, such as fewer
abortions, miscarriages, and lower maternal mortality (3).
This finding is particularly encouraging considering that even the
population reduction attributed to China’s controversial one-child
policy might have been assisted by an already declining fertility rate
(49), much as the world’s second most-populous country, India, has
demonstrated over the last several decades (50). Perhaps with
a more planned (rather than forced) approach to family planning,
substantial reductions in future population size are plausible.
Better family planning could be achieved not only by providing
greater access to contraception, but through education, health
improvements directed at infant mortality rates, and outreach that
would assuage some of the negative social and cultural stigmas
attached to their use (33). A greater commitment from high-
income countries to fund such programs, especially in the de-
veloping world, is a key component of any future successes (51).
Our aim was not to forecast a precise trajectory or size of the
human population over the coming century, but to demonstrate
what is possible when assuming various underlying dynamics, so
as to understand where to direct policy most effectively. Al-
though all projections lacked a stochastic component (notwith-
standing the prescribed trends in vital rates and mass mortality
catastrophes imposed), such year-to-year variation is typically
smoothed when population sizes are large, as is the case for
humans. Catastrophic deaths arising from pandemics or major
wars could, of course, lead to a wide range of future population
sizes. Our choice of the number of people dying in the catas-
trophe scenarios illustrated here were therefore necessarily ar-
bitrary, but we selected a range of values up to what we consider
to be extreme (e.g., 6 billion deaths over 5 y) to demonstrate that
even future events that rival or plausibly exceed past societal
cataclysms cannot guarantee small future population sizes with-
out additional measures, such as fertility control. Furthermore,
we did not incorporate any density feedback to emulate the
effects of a planet-wide human carrying capacity on vital rates
(3), apart from scenarios imitating possible demographic con-
sequences of reduced food supply or resource-driven war or
disease, because such relationships are strongly technology-
dependent and extremely difficult and politically sensitive to
forecast (26, 52). Furthermore, regional comparisons should be
considered only as indicative because we did not explicitly model
interregional migration, and the projected rates of change and
final densities are dependent on whether vital rates are assumed
to be constant or change according to recent trends. Local
population densities do not necessarily correlate perfectly with
regional consumption given world disparity in wealth distribu-
tion, environmental leakage, and foreign land grabbing (18).
Despite these simplifications, our results are indicative of the
relative influence of particular sociological events on human
population trajectories over the next century.
Globally, human population density has been shown to predict
the number of threatened species among nations (53–55), and at
a national scale, there is a clear historical relationship between
human population size and threats to biodiversity (56, 57).
However, because of the spatial congruence between human
population size and species richness, a lack of data on extinc-
tions, and variability across methods, there is only a weak cor-
relation globally between human density and observed species
extinctions (58). Nonetheless, the pressures are clear, with half of
world protected areas losing their biodiversity (59) because of
high human stressors—including population growth rates and


































Fig. 3. Size of dependent population. Proportion of people <15 y or >65 y
per time step, and their ratio to the (most productive) remainder of the
population (dependency ratio) for (A) Scenario 1 (BAU), and (B) Scenario 3
(decreasing mortality, increasing age at primiparity, decreasing fertility to
one child per female). See Methods for detailed scenario descriptions.












The socio-political argument for encouraging high fertility rates
to offset aging populations (61) that would otherwise put a strain
on the productive (working) component of the population is de-
monstrably weak. This is because focusing solely on the growing
aged component of a population ignores the concomitant reduction
in the proportion of young dependants as the affluence level and
fertility rates of women shift to older primiparity and fewer children.
Thus, our projections show that even an aging population maintains
an approximately constant number of dependants per working-age
person, even under scenarios or in regions of relatively rapid pro-
jected decline (e.g., Regions 8, 10, and 13) (Fig. 4).
The broader question of what constitutes an optimum human
population size (and how long it would take) is fraught with
uncertainty, being so highly dependent on technological and
sociological advances (9, 62). It has been suggested that a total
world population between 1 and 2 billion might ensure that all
individuals lived prosperous lives, assuming limited change in per
capita consumption and land/materials use (1, 62). According to
our basic fertility-reduction model (to one child per female by
2100), and excluding mass mortality events, achieving such a goal
would take a minimum of 140 y (2 billion by 2153) (Fig. 1B), but
realistically much longer given decreasing mortality rates and the
intractability and questionable morality of enforcing a worldwide
one-child policy as fertility control. A considerably larger optimal
human population size is also feasible if society embraces techno-
logical improvements (including sustainable energy) that allow for
decoupling of impacts and near-closed-system recycling, and so can
vastly reduce consumption rates of primary resources (63, 64).
Conclusion
There are clearly many environmental and societal benefits to
ongoing fertility reduction in the human population (3, 48, 58),
but here we show that it is a solution long in the making from
which our great-great-great-great grandchildren might ultimately
benefit, rather than people living today. It therefore cannot be ar-
gued to be the elephant in the room for immediate environmental
Fig. 4. Regional variation and impacts. Human population projections under the BAU levels of population growth (2013 matrix; Scenario 1) for 14 subregions
(R1–R14; see below for country composition). Regional shading indicates relative mean population density projected for 2100: white shading = 0 persons km−2 to
darker shading = 656.6 persons km−2). Values next to each region line (legends) indicate the ratio of the projected 2100 population (N2100) to the 2013 start
population (N2013). Red hatched overlay indicates position of global Biodiversity Hotspots (a–ii: see below for full Hotspot list). Full Hotspot listing per region and
associated projected values are also provided in Table S2. Subregion country composition (boldface indicates region number on themap): Africa D, Region 1: Angola
(AGO), Benin (BEN), Burkina Faso (BFA), Cameroon (CMR), Cape Verde (CPV), Algeria (DZA), Gabon (GAB), Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GIN), Gambia (GMB), Guinea-Bissau
(GNB), Equatorial Guinea (GNQ), Liberia (LBR), Madagascar (MDG), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Mauritius (MUS), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra
Leone (SLE), Sao Tome and Principe (STP), Seychelles (SYC), Chad (TCD), Togo (TGO); Africa E, Region 2: Burundi (BDI), Botswana (BWA), Central African Republic
(CAF), Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), The Democratic Republic of the Congo (COD), Congo (COG), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Kenya (KEN), Lesotho (LSO), Mozambique (MOZ),
Malawi (MWI), Namibia (NAM), Rwanda (RWA), Swaziland (SWZ), United Republic of Tanzania (TZA), Uganda (UGA), South Africa (ZAF), Zambia (ZMB), Zimbabwe
(ZWE); Americas A, Region 3: Canada (CAN), Cuba (CUB), United States (USA); Americas B, Region 4: Argentina (ARG), Antigua and Barbuda (ATG), Bahamas (BHS),
Belize (BLZ), Brazil (BRA), Barbados (BRB), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), Dominica (DMA), Dominican Republic (DOM), Grenada (GRD), Guyana (GUY),
Honduras (HND), Jamaica (JAM), Saint Kitts and Nevis (KNA), Saint Lucia (LCA), Mexico (MEX), Panama (PAN), Paraguay (PRY), El Salvador (SLV), Suriname (SUR),
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Uruguay (URY), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VCT), Venezuela (VEN); Americas D, Region 5: Bolivia (BOL), Ecuador (ECU), Gua-
temala (GTM), Haiti (HTI), Nicaragua (NIC), Peru (PER); Eastern Mediterranean B, Region 6: United Arab Emirates (ARE), Bahrain (BHR), Cyprus (CYP), Islamic Republic
of Iran (IRN), Jordan (JOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon (LBN), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (LBY), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Syrian Arab Republic (SYR),
Tunisia (TUN); Eastern Mediterranean D, Region 7: Afghanistan (AFG), Djibouti (DJI), Egypt (EGY), Iraq (IRQ), Morocco (MAR), Pakistan (PAK), Somalia (SOM), Sudan
(SDN), Yemen (YEM); Europe A, Region 8: Andorra (AND), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland (CHE), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK),
Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Greece (GRC), Croatia (HRV), Ireland (IRL), Iceland (ISL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Luxembourg (LUX),
Monaco (MCO), Malta (MLT), The Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), San Marino (SMR), Slovenia (SVN), Sweden (SWE); Europe B, Region 9: Albania
(ALB), Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bulgaria (BGR), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Georgia (GEO), Kyrgyzstan (KGZ), The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (MKD), Montenegro (MNE), Poland (POL), Romania (ROU), Serbia (SRB), Slovakia (SVK), Tajikistan (TJK), Turkmenistan (TKM), Turkey (TUR), Uzbekistan
(UZB); Europe C, Region 10: Belarus (BLR), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Moldova (MDA), Russian Federation (RUS),
Ukraine (UKR); Southeast Asia B, Region 11: Indonesia (IDN), Sri Lanka (LKA), Thailand (THA), East Timor (TLS); Southeast Asia D, Region 12: Bangladesh (BGD),
Bhutan (BTN), India (IND), Maldives (MDV), Myanmar (MMR), Nepal (NPL), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (PRK); Western Pacific A, Region 13: Australia
(AUS), Brunei Darussalam (BRN), Japan (JPN), New Zealand (NZL), Singapore (SGP); Western Pacific B, Region 14: China (CHN), Cook Islands (COK), Fiji (FJI), Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), Cambodia (KHM), Kiribati (KIR), Republic of Korea (KOR), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LAO), Marshall Islands (MHL), Mongolia
(MNG), Malaysia (MYS), Niue (NIU), Nauru (NRU), Philippines (PHL), Palau (PLW), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands (SLB), Tonga (TON), Tuvalu (TUV),
Vietnam (VNM), Vanuatu (VUT), Samoa (WSM). Biodiversity Hotspots: a, Tropical Andes; b, Mesoamerica; c, Caribbean Islands; d, Atlantic Forest; e, Tumbes-Chocó-
Magdalena; f, Cerrado; g, Chilean Winter Rainfall-Valdivian Forests; h, California Floristic Province; I, Madagascar and the Indian Ocean Islands; j, Coastal Forests of
Eastern Africa; k, Guinean Forests of West Africa; l, Cape Floristic Region; m, Succulent Karoo; n, Mediterranean Basin; o, Caucasus; p, Sundaland; q, Wallacea; r,
Philippines; s, Indo-Burma, India andMyanmar; t, Mountains of Southwest China; u, Western Ghats and Sri Lanka; v, Southwest Australia; w, New Caledonia; x, New
Zealand; y, Polynesia-Micronesia; z, Madrean Pine-Oak Woodlands; aa, Maputaland-Pondoland-Albany; bb, Eastern Afromontane; cc, Horn of Africa; dd, Irano-
Anatolian; ee, Mountains of Central Asia; ff, Eastern Himalaya, Nepal; gg, Japan; hh, East Melanesian Islands; ii, Forests of East Australia.
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sustainability and climate policy. A corollary of this finding is that
society’s efforts toward sustainability would be directed more pro-
ductively toward adapting to the large and increasing human pop-
ulation by rapidly reducing our footprint as much as possible
through technological (63, 64) and social innovation (3, 65), de-
vising cleverer ways to conserve remaining species and ecosystems,
encouraging per capita reductions in consumption of irreplaceable
goods (58), and treating population as a long-term planning goal.
It is therefore inevitable that the virtually locked-in increase in
the global human population during the 21st century—regardless of
trends in per capita consumption rates—risks increasing the threat
to the environment posed by humans because of growing aggregate
and accumulated demands. Apart from efforts to accelerate (rather
than reverse) ongoing declines in fertility, ameliorated especially by
effective family planning, female empowerment, better education,
and political and religious endorsement of sustainability in the
developing world (48), the only other immediate control on regional
population trends could take the form of (politically and morally
contentious) country-specific immigration policies. Accepting the
difficulty of this, the question of how many more species we lose,
ecosystem services we degrade, and natural capital we destroy will
therefore depend mostly—at least over the coming century—on
how much we can limit the damage through timely and efficient
technological and social advances. However, this is not an excuse
for neglecting ethical measures for fertility reduction now; it could
avoid millions of deaths by midcentury and possibly keep the planet
more habitable for Homo sapiens in the next.
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